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David Owen believes in the law of products liability. By this I do not mean that
he necessarily supports an expansive approach to products liability litigation. Professor
Owen is a thoughtful centrist; in some areas he calls for expansion, and in others he calls
for restriction. In asserting that he believes in the law of products liability, I mean that he
feels there is value in thinking and writing about it as a distinct field of law rather than as
merely bits and parts of tort, contract, and other areas of law. Primarily because products
liability relies so heavily on tort and contract law, some respected scholars have seen
little benefit and perhaps harm in treating products liability as a discrete field of law.2
Although he finds “much power” in critics’ arguments, Owen supports what he describes
as “a major shift away from conceptualizing products liability problems as ‘tort’ or
‘contract’ and toward viewing these problems as functionally distinct.”3
Professor Owen’s enthusiasm for products liability as a distinct area of law is not
surprising, given that he is one of the field’s most prominent progenitors, or at least one
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of its most prominent nurturers. Of course he was not present when Benjamin Cardozo
inked MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co,4 when Roger Traynor wrote his concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.5 or his unanimous opinion in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products6 or when William Prosser drafted section 402A for the American
Law Institute.7 However, those founding fathers (unfortunately, “fathers” is the gendercorrect term due to the era) did not take products liability to maturity as a functionally
distinct body of law. This task was left to the next generation of judges and scholars.
Enthusiastic judicialand legislative acceptance and expansion of products liability
in the 1960’s and 1970’s provided the fundamental elements that enabled thinking about
the field as a distinct body of law. However, the work of Owen and other scholars to
chronicle, categorize, and critique emerging products liability doctrines provided mortar
to hold together the bricks created by courts and legislatures. Scholars such as Owen
likely created or shaped some of the bricks, too, in a field that underwent explosive and
confused evolution and thus was constantly casting about for guidance and for stabilizing
influences.
Professor Owen’s work without question belongs on any list of the most
important scholarship molding and nurturing products liability as a body of law.
Although he has written more than his share of outstanding theoretical scholarship,8 his
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efforts as a chronicler of judicial trends and rules have been particularly significantin
encouraging courts and scholars to think of products liability as a distinct body of law. In
1980 Owen, along with coauthor John Montgomery, produced the first products liability
casebook ever to be published. The casebook, which is perennially among the bestsellers in the field, eventually added Mary Davis as another coauthor and is now in its
fourth edition. The casebook’s quality in addressing products liability as a body of law is
unsurpassed. It was already a well-established source when I began teaching, and I have
relied on it each of the approximately 15 times I have taught products liability as an
upper-division course.
Owen’s coauthored three volume treatise with Stuart Madden and Mary Davis,
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, was published in 2000 and serves as a
leading overview of the field useful both to practitioners and scholars.9 Earlier Owen
served as a coauthor on the torts hornbook originated by William Prosser and Page
Keeton, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS.10 The famous Prosser hornbook,
while preceding Owen’s work on treatises more narrowly directed at products liability,
significantly added to practitioner’s understanding of the new and rapidly growing field.
Supplementing his outstanding theoretical publications with several articles focused on
chronicling the development of case law has expanded Owen’s audience and his efforts
to address products liability as a functionally distinct field of law.11
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The work of Owen and others to encourage thinking about products liability as a
distinct field of law have met with overwhelming success. An August, 2004 study
counted roughly 15,000 products liability decisions “of some significance” in the United
States.12 Since the 1960’s, an explosion of increasingly complex rules and principles have
developed in products liability cases.13 Practicing lawyers and judges have increasingly
considered products liability as a distinct practice area, and the great majority of
American law schools have offered courses specifically focused on products liability as a
field of law. Many jurisdictions, both domestic and international, have enacted products
liability statutory schemes treating such cases as a distinct subject.14 When the American
Law Institute decided to begin work on its RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS in the early
1990’s, it decided to segregate products liability as a distinct project separate from other
torts issues. Further, it decided to tackle products liability before addressing other tortsrelated issues, recognizing that “products liability is highest in priority for reformulation,
for it is socially significant and technically complicated.”15 Professor Owen served as the
project’s editorial adviser. In assessing the debate over whether to consider products
liability an independent field of law, Owen concludes:
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There is simply no arguing that products liability draws heavily from tort,
contract, and other fields of law. Yet, its separate treatment by courts,
academics, practitioners and legislatures around the world dispels the view
that modern products liability is bits and pieces of other fields of law, that
it has no separate identity of its own. Academics may argue this point until
the cows come home, but products liability is a field of law distinct unto
itself.16
As noted above, Owen has himself to thank (although he would be too modest to
do so) for some measure of products liability’s victory in attaining status as a functionally
distinct field of law through his many years of work with products liability hornbooks,
casebooks, theoretical law review articles and books, and law review articles that
chronicle trends and rules in products liability case law. One of his most recent
contributions to the field of products liability law is also among his most significant.
Owen’s PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, published as part of the West Hornbook
Series in 2005, is almost certainly destined to become one of the leading authorities on
modern products liability law. Owen explains his goal for the hornbook as being “to trace
the evolution of products liability law in America, to examine how legislatures and courts
presently define and apply the law, and to explore an array of problematic issues on
which courts and commentators disagree.”17 Hornbooks are sometimes perceived as (and
in fact often are) merely overview recitations of general legal principles. Owen’s
hornbook is much more than that, as it, in his words, “selectively critiques products
liability law in America in the early stages of the 21st Century.”18
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Along with solid chronicling of products liability doctrines and trends,19 Owen’s
elegant and thought-provoking normative analyses add significantly to the hornbook’s
usefulness. One example may be found in his analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,20 the 1993 United States Supreme Court case that has been interpreted
as significantly raising standards on the admissibility of expert testimony in federal
courts, and that has strongly influenced expert testimony standards in state courts as well.
I will use a bit of Owen’s discussion of Daubert as a launching point to share some
reflections on the case and on products liability’s evolution as a field of law.
Daubert, perhaps the most significant civil case of any kind in the United States
in the past quarter century, provides strong evidence for Professor Owen’s view that
products liability has developed to the point that it should be considered as a field unto
itself. For Daubert is a child of products liability. It was conceived in the explosive
growth in reliance upon expert testimony that came with the equally explosive growth of
products liability, and it was birthed in one of products liability’s early mass tort
morasses: Bendectin litigation. Without products liability, there would have been no
Daubert, and there would have been relatively littleperceived need for a decision like
Daubert.
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Professor Owen wisely decided to address Daubert in some depth in PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW and, while he sees some grounds for concern about application of the
case and its progeny, his overall verdict on Daubert’s legacy is fairly supportive:
By requiring experts to provide reasoned bases for their opinions, and by
requiring that such opinions be relevant to the legal issues in the case and
grounded in reliable methodology, the reliability and relevancy principles
of Daubert, used properly, provide a firm foundation for the fair and
rational resolution of the scientific and technological issues which lie at
the heart of products liability adjudication.21
I will address two aspects of Daubert to share some of my own reflections on the
case and its relationship to products liability as a distinctive field of law. The first aspect I
will examine is the extent to which Daubert and its progeny might be both reflecting and
generating evolution in the substantive common law of products liability. I will also
provide some thoughts about how Daubert has both strengthened and weakened product
liability’s ongoing quest to achieve a “rough sense of justice.”22
The first question, whether Daubert and its progeny have and will reflect or
influence the substance of products liability law, is easily answered. In a word: yes. A
decision perceived as having such a significant impact on the outcome of many products
liability cases simply cannot avoid influencing substantive common law to some extent.
Substance and procedure are not neatly separated in the real world of products liability.
The broader goal of justice renders them inextricably intertwined, and a significant
change to one must be felt by the other as well.
The evolution of the prominent products liability scholar Aaron Twerski provides
an interesting illustration of how Daubert is influencing thought on substantive products
21
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liability law. Dean Twerski, co-reporter with Professor James Henderson for the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, is not known for having a
generally expansive approach to products liability. Indeed, Twerski acknowledges that
representatives of the plaintiffs’ bar, such as the American Trial Lawyers’ Association,
assailed his RESTATEMENT (THIRD) as a “tort reform” package.23 One academic critic
asserted during the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s drafting process that “The writings of
[Twerski and Henderson] over the past two decades indicate a conservative penchant
toward negligence and manufacturer-protective rules.”24 Another scholar recently
described Twerski and Henderson as “academic critics of judicial expansion of product
manufacturer liability.”25 Professor Henderson has written that “When I was first
appointed [as co-reporter with Twerski for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)], Plaintiffs’ Bar
had, collectively, what might pass for an aneurysm.”26 In truth, both scholars have not
always favored defendants in their writings.27 However, on balance, few would likely
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argue that the balance of Twerski’s (or of Henderson’s) writings lean toward increasing
opportunities for plaintiffs to sue product sellers.
The reasonable alternative design test promoted by Dean Twerski and Professor
Henderson for design defect claims was, without question, the most controversial aspect
of the products liability Restatement. Indeed, the debate in the ALI over this topic was
fierce. The test requires that, as a prerequisite to prevailing in design defects claims,
plaintiffs establish proof that a reasonable alternative design exists or could have been
created and that failing to utilize the reasonable alternative design rendered the product
not reasonably safe.28 This test heightens reliance on expensive expert witnesses, which
are usually necessary to establish whether a reasonable alternative design would be
feasible.
The expense caused by the test’s focus on expert testimony was one of critics’
most significant complaints about the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s adoption of a reasonable
alternative design requirement. Opponents of the expert testimony-driven reasonable
alternative design test argued that it would bar access to the courts for all legitimate
design defect claims where the claims’ value was not high enough to pay the price
needed for expensive expert witness testimony.29 Many critics argued instead for a
defectiveness test based on whether the product design violated a reasonable consumer’s
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expectations of safety, asserting among other things that the consumer expectations test
provides greater protection of consumers’ interests.30
As Professor Owen notes in PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, reliance on expensive
experts is less likely to be needed on the issue of defectiveness when courts adopt the
consumer expectation test over the reasonable alternative design test, particularly in cases
involving simple consumer goods.31 The Daubert decision came out at about the same
time the debate between reasonable alternative design and consumer expectations began
raging in the ALI. Daubert, and particularly lower courts’ use of it as a tool to
significantly toughen standards for experts, arguably provided another basis for critics to
maintain that the reasonable alternative design test is simply too expensive to plaintiffs to
achieve justice on a broader level.
Although probably a majority of courts have adopted the reasonable alternative
design test, a substantial minority have rejected it for the consumer expectation approach
or other approaches. Courts’ reaction to the Henderson/Twerski RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF

TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY is nothing like courts’ reaction to the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)’s section 402A. In the 1960’s and 70’s courts overwhelmingly adopted 402A;
it has been described as the closest thing to “holy writ” ever produced by the ALI.32 The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s reception by courts has been much more mixed, and one must
30
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wonder how influential Daubert may have been in convincing several courts not to adopt
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)’s expert-intensive approach. Further, if dissatisfaction with
Daubert expands, it is interesting to wonder whether more courts will adopt the
sometimes less expert-intensive consumer expectation test or other tests in the future.
Even before becoming a co-reporter for the products liability Restatement, Dean
Twerski was one of the most prominent advocates of the perceived as pro-defense,
expert-intensive, reasonable alternative design test.33 As noted previously, he was also
perceived by many as having a restrictive view of products liability generally.

34
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this same Dean Twerski, along with prominent evidence scholar Margaret Berger, is now
arguing that in some cases involving non-essential drugs, courts should change the law to
make it much easier to win by eliminating the causation of physical harm element.
Further, he is directly pinning his argument for an expansion of products liability law on
Daubert. This suggestion for expansion of the common law of products liability directly
in response to Daubert is significant not only because the prominent and arguably
conservative Dean Twerski coauthored the proposal, but also because of his co-author’s
prominence in the field of evidence.35
The dramatic Berger/Twerski proposal is presented in an article recently
published in November in the Michigan Law Review entitled Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert.36 The Berger/Twerski proposal is that an “informed choice
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cause of action” should exist for pharmaceutical products even without proof that
physical harm was caused when:
1)

The causal relationship between the toxic agent and P’s harm is
unresolved at the time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved;

2)

The drug is not therapeutic, but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or
to improve lifestyle;

3)

It is almost certain that a patient made aware of the risk that is alleged to
be associated with consumption of the drug would have refused to take it;
and

4)

Defendant drug company was aware of the potential risk or should have
undertaken Rx testing to discover the risk and failed to provide the
requisite information to the patient or physician.37

This Berger/Twerski proposal basically calls for a negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action in a context far beyond the parameters of where courts
have previously allowed such claims. They attempt to limit the usual Pandora’s Box
concerns that attend efforts to expand negligent infliction of emotional distress claims by
restricting their proposed lawsuit to situations involving less important “discomfort” or
“lifestyle” drugs rather than “therapeutic” drugs, and by limiting it to situations in which
causation is “almost certain.”38 Restricting the claim to situations in which the question of
physical harm is proved to likely remain unproved may also be viewed as an effort to
keep the proposal limited and thus more palatable.39
Dean Twerski and Professor Berger use Bendectin, the drug at issue in the
Daubert case, and the drug Parlodel as illustrations of situations in which their proposed
cause of action might be appropriate. Bendectin was marketed between 1957 and 1983 to

37
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approximately 36 million women to treat morning sickness during pregnancy.40 Many
lawsuits were filed contending that Bendectin caused stunted limbs in the children of
mothers taking the drug, and that the manufacturer did not warn of this risk.41 Most
courts eventually found as a matter of law that the evidence supporting these allegations
of birth defects was not sufficiently strong to permit findings of causation.42 However,
there was significant mosaic evidence of potential causation of birth defects that,
according to Twerski and Berger, was sufficient to create an appropriate and
understandable desire on the part of parents to know of the risks for a drug that merely
alleviated discomfort.43 This mosaic evidence included “(1) in vitro (test tube) studies, (2)
in vivo (animal) studies, (3) similarities between ingredients in Bendectin with chemical
structures similar to known teratogens, and (4) retrospective epidemiological studies to
support their contention that the drug caused birth defects.”44
Parlodel, the second drug cited as an example by Twerski and Berger, was
marketed beginning in 1980 to women seeking to end lactation after childbirth.45 Some
users brought lawsuits contending that the drug caused strokes, and that no warning of
this risk was provided.46 Evidence existed suggesting that Parlodel may cause strokes, but
most courts found it too idiosyncratic and unreliable to be presented to a jury.47 However,
in 1989 Parlodel was withdrawn from the market as an anti-lactation drug because it was

40
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found to have no greater benefit than aspirin.48 Twerski and Berger believe Parlodel is a
good illustration of a case in which their proposed new cause of action would be
warranted because “It is hard to believe that a woman warned of the risk of strokes and
told of the comparative safety of treatment by over-the-counter analgesics would opt to
take Parlodel.”49
Twerski and Berger argue that cases such as Bendectin and Parlodel involving
uncertain risk are the hallmark situations in which Daubert denies recovery. They are
clearly concerned that many cases involving drugs and other toxic agents that may have
serious risks are lost because of difficulties proving causation to an acceptable certainty,
rather than because causation does not in fact exist. They are also concerned that
Daubert’s high evidentiary bar exacerbates the problem of proving causation in many
legitimate claims. Declaring that “The current state of Daubert drug litigation is
intolerable,”50 they note that:
Plaintiffs have, in large part, been stymied by their inability to establish
that toxic agents, no matter how potentially dangerous, were actually
responsible for the harms they have suffered. Their difficulties in this
regard have increased exponentially since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.51
They conclude “That a toxic drug cannot be proven to have definitively caused a harm
does not mean that plaintiffs should be deprived of the right to choose whether they wish
to subject themselves to the material risk of that harm actually taking place.”52
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I have significant sympathy for these concerns. Who would dispute that 100 years
from now scientists will have clear knowledge that many drugs currently in use cause
serious harm even though plaintiffs are not able to meet the high burden of proving so at
present? Further, as Professor Owen points out in PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW,
manufacturers have an inherent advantage in expert-reliant casesbecause they have
access to experts naturally, being in the business of making the product – their experts
may even be their own employees who designed the product. Plaintiffs must hire an
academic or a private consultant.53 Further, manufacturers typically pay for their experts
with insurance money, and have much deeper pockets to foot these bills than do injured
consumers, who have to pay out of their own pockets, which are usually shallow rather
than deep.
Having expressed sympathy with the concerns voiced by the Berger/Twerski
proposal, I will not hold my breath expecting a majority of courts to fall in line with it,
despite the prominence of its authors. Eliminating the causation of physical harm element
in some products liability cases is a truly bold proposal, not an evolutionary baby-step.
Further, as the authors acknowledge, courts would have difficulty defining with

53

See Owen, supra note 2, at 358. Owen notes:
The bulk of experienced and otherwise qualified experts in most fields of product
design, manufacturing, and labeling are employed by private industry, often by the
manufacturing enterprises who are defendants in products liability litigation.
Thus, because such persons are already in its employ, a manufacturer usually has
little difficulty in finding appropriate engineering and other experts to help defend
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designed the accident product, advised on appropriate warnings, and designed and
supervised the assembly process by which it was produced. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, on
the other hand, generally are limited to two principle resource pools for expert
witness talent: universities and private consultants.
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consistency the “lifestyle or discomfort” – i.e., lower utility – drugs for which Berger and
Twerski would like to limit their standard to keep it from being too broad.54 I myself took
a stab in a 1994 article at arguing for a more relaxed liability standard in cases involving
prescription products with primarily cosmetic utility, and courts have shown remarkable
restraint in not rushing too quickly to follow my suggestion.55
Professor David Bernstein recently wrote a paper expressing additional concerns
about the Berger/Twerski proposal.56 Much of Bernstein’s critique centers on
disagreement with an assertion by Twerski and Berger that Bendectin provides, in
Professor Bernstein’s words, the “paradigmatic example” of why courts should adopt the
Berger/Twerski proposal.57 Bernstein argues that if Bendectin, a safe drug in his view, is
an example of a situation in which the Berger/Twerski cause of action would be
appropriate, the cause of action is clearly overbroad. He notes that by 1977 fourteen
epidemiological studies had been performed on Bendectin, and none of them found an
association between the drug and birth defects.58 He concludes that “by the early 1980’s,
there was a solid consensus in the medical community that Bendectin was not a
teratogen.” Rather than serving as an illustration of why the Berger/Twerski proposal
54

See Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 288 (“We are aware that there is no bright line that can be
drawn between lifestyle and therapeutic drugs. Nonetheless, the distinction is important as a beginning
point in recognizing a cause of action for informed choice. In the former, the issue of decision-causation,
that is, whether the plaintiff would have chosen against taking the drug if informed of the possible serious
side effects, is much clearer”).
55
See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Sharing Accountability for Breast Implants: Strict Products Liability and
Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic Product Transactions, 21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 873 (1994). Similarly to Dean Twerski and Professor Berger, I acknowledged in the article that
clearly distinguishing medical products with primarily cosmetic utility from medical products with
restorative utility would be difficult. However, given the rise in use of cosmetic medical products and the
lack of special societal utility of such products I urged courts to make the distinction when possible and to
exclude primarily cosmetic products from comment k exclusion from strict liability in hybrid sales/services
transactions. See id. at 911-12.
56
See Bernstein, supra note 36 (forthcoming; available at Social Science Research Network:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 775065).
57
Id. at 2.
58
Id. at 2-3.
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should be adopted, Bernstein sees Bendectin litigation as an illustration of “unreasonable
fears of the lay public, stirred by irresponsible interest groups, hired gun delusional
experts, credulous media coverage and plaintiffs’ lawyers.”59 He adds several additional
concerns about the proposal, including assertions that:
1)

“The proposal invites reliance on unreliable testimony;”60

2)

“Jurors are not competent to determine subtle risk assessment issues;”61

3)

“Even assuming juror competence, the proposal asks too much of
jurors;”62

4)

“The proposal ignores the problem inherent in multiple trials;”63

5)

“The proposal fails to consider the potential costs of informed choice
litigation;”64

6)

“The informed choice proposal would lead to a vast surfeit of warning;”65

and
7)

“The informed choice proposal may be barred by the preemption
doctrine.”66

Without addressing each of Professor Bernstein’s concerns in detail, it may be
useful to note that much of his critique could be seen as reflecting broader views about
the efficacy or lack of efficacy of our current products liability system. For example,
Bernstein’s concerns that juries are not good at determining subtle risk assessment issues,
and his concerns that the dynamics of mass litigation often force defendants to settle even
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
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nonmeritorious claims – both may implicate products liability cases well beyond those in
the limited target area of the Berger/Twerski proposal.
Professor Bernstein’s use of a Daubert-related analysis to perhaps reveal some of
his more general reservations about modern products liability litigation is not surprising
or unique. I perceive that the pattern of courts and commentators finding in Daubert and
discussions of Daubert a launching point for expressions of broader concerns that
products liability is too expansive or too restrictive is both common and understandable.
Professors Ed Cheng and Albert Yoon perhaps make an analogous point in a recent
empirical article arguing that Daubert’s strongest impact has been its educational
function in sensitizing courts to the dangers of junk science generally, regardless of
whether a case is tried in a Daubert jurisdiction or in a Frye jurisdiction.67 The specifics
of Daubert’s holding are not what has mattered most for products liability law; what has
mattered most is how courts and commentators have used Daubert to change and to
engage in a broader discussion about what is good and bad for our products liability
system.
Where the broader Daubert-inspired discussion will lead us of course remains
uncertain. However, judicial and scholarlyreaction to Daubert, such as the sometimes
conservative Dean Twerski’s call for doctrinal expansion, both reflects and predicts some
level of evolutionary impulse in products liability law. We should not expect to be able to
fully appreciate the impact it will make quickly – thirteen years has past since Daubert
was decided, and what we do not know about its full impact on products liability still
67

Edward K Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 503 (2005) (addressing empirical study undertaken by
authors in which removal rates to federal court were found to follow the same trends both in Daubert
jurisdictions and Frye jurisdictions, leading the authors to conclude that defense lawyers may not perceive
the federal Daubert rule to offer significant advantages over Frye).
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substantially outweighs what we do know about it impact. The common law of products
liability and of torts may experience rapid evolutionary jolts, such as the meteoric rise of
strict products liability in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but quick growth spurts such as this are
not the end of the story. From a long-term perspective, tort and products liability law are
things that usually meander slowly toward, in the words of Judge Andrews in Palsgraf
quoted previously, a “rough sense of justice.”68
I use the phrase “meander toward” intentionally, rather than “stride crisply
toward,” or “run toward.” The common law of torts and of products liability meander
toward a rough sense of justice perhaps a bit like tourists with little sense of time
meander from one edge of a town they are visiting to the far edge of the town. Torts and
products liability move in starts and stops, they wander from one side of the boulevard to
the other to investigate the sights, they venture down interesting side streets and alleys
only to find them leading to dead ends, and then return back to the main street to meander
further along their way toward justice.
I say this with some fondness, not derision, because eventually leisurely tourists
reach their destination, and along the way they have seen and experienced much more of
the town’s important aspects than had they scurried straight across townwithout any
interest in the landscape. I do not perceive the common law of torts or of products
liability as consciously following a corrective justice model, a law and economics model,
a deterrence model, or any other limited model of justice. Their shared guidance system
is broader than any of those models; it is at the same time more complex in its
manifestations and more simple in its goals. Again in the words of Judge Andrews
(although he was applying them specifically to proximate cause), tort law’s model is
68

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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simply seeking to fulfill a rough sense of justice.69 The same model applies to products
liability. As is the case with those respectful of a broad range of religions, the common
law paths of torts and of products liability find some truth in each of the models
academics champion as their proper goal, and their sense of justice is a rough
combination of nearly all of the proposed models. Thus, sometimes the path of the
common law toward its sense of justice cannot be easily or neatly explained, but even in
such situations its progress can often be vaguely felt.
Perhaps what is being felt in courts’ and scholars’ current grappling with the
impact of Daubert is that the case and its progeny have at the same time both helped and
hurt courts’ search for a rough sense of justice in products liability law. There are of
course many roads to justice and injustice, and I will briefly highlight two that are
especially relevant to Daubert. Objectively uncertain results invite injustice, and this
form of injustice arises when courts do not enforce a sufficiently strenuous evidentiary
threshold. However, injustice also exists when there are thousands or perhaps hundreds of
thousands of meritorious cases that can never be undertaken because it is too expensive to
do so or because, although the plaintiff is correct, she cannot prove she is correct with
sufficient certainty under a particularly demanding standard.70 The more strictly courts
apply Daubert to avoid injustice from junk science, the more courts also create injustice
by pricing out valid claims where expensive expert fees are not economically viable or
where the high standard makes proving valid cases impossible. This conflict presents a
balancing question, and how we feel about the balance may say as much about our
personal leanings as it does about justice itself.
69

Id.
See Berger & Twerski, supra note 36, at 271 (“Preparing for and litigating Daubert has
undoubtedly made litigation more expensive than before”).
70

20

In products liability cases the most interesting questions about Daubert might
relate less to specific evidentiary standards than to whether we think products liability
law simply expanded too much in the latter half of the twentieth century. Daubert may be
in effect a reform tool for those who think we have too much products liability litigation,
and a powerful impediment for those who think our level of products liability litigation
helps rather than hurts society.
When pondering how reaction to Daubert reflects broader views, it is interesting
to contemplate judicial psychology. It is easy to imagine that judges might feel most
strongly the injustice of watching a jury reach the wrong conclusion because unreliable
evidence was slickly marketed to them. Judicial frustration and indignation over
repeatedly witnessing such results is understandable and of course appropriate. Another
form of injustice, however, is neatly hidden from direct judicial view. Judges see the
undeserving plaintiffs who sometimes win under looser rules, but they do not have to see
the thousands of injured plaintiffs with legitimate cases who never get to a courtroom
because of the financial or evidentiary burden Daubert imposes. However, just because
the injustice against deserving plaintiffs is less visible does not make it any less real.
Having an especially demanding standard that leads to a tidy sense of justice for judges
presiding over trials can cause significant structural unfairness that is conveniently easy
not to contemplate.
A factor going the other way is that visible injustice in the judicial system has the
additional cost of eroding the public’s confidence in the courts. If citizens believe that
trialswith fli msy expert evidence are an exercise in snake oil salesmanship rather than
objective justice, the civil justice system is harmed. But perhaps we should be concerned
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about the possibility of courts favoring a more visible manifestation of justice over a less
visible manifestation but equally real manifestation of justice based on the very issue of
public visibility. Such favoritism may represent a form of snake oil salesmanship in itself,
ironically utilized, in this context, to limit snake oil salesmanship at trials.
Those who do not believe products liability’s expansion over the past 50 years has
been on the whole more negative than positive have several choices in reacting to
Daubert. One is to oppose its current application and argue that it causes more harms
than benefits to justice. This may not be the same thing as opposing Daubert itself,
because so much of Daubert’s impact seems to be in how it has been interpreted and
applied. Another approach could be to argue that perhaps courts should follow both
impulses discussed above: to enhance objective justice in trials where expert testimony is
truly central by keeping something like the current Daubert standard, but at the same
time applauding and encouraging substantive evolution to make civil litigation less
frequently a battle of the increasingly expensive experts, where such evolution is
consistent with best-achieving a rough sense of justice.
Although he places caveats on his praise and I place caveats on my criticism, on
balance Professor Owen’s assessment of Daubert and its implications may be more
positive than my own. In PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, after citing a large number of cases
in which courts excluded plaintiffs’ expert testimony based on Daubert, he writes:
It may well be that the experts in each case in which the testimony
was excluded propounded bad science, or perhaps the plaintiffs’
attorneys simply failed to adequately prepare their experts on the
Daubert requirements before the trial, or perhaps they failed at trial
(or at a Daubert hearing) to provide the court with a sufficient offer
of proof.71
71

Owen, supra note 2, at 370.
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In my thinking this fails to pay sufficient attention to some important possibilities
that must be factors in many lawsuits involving Daubert exclusions. For example, given
the frequency with which drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration and once
considered safe are eventually recognized as being in fact dangerous, in many cases
plaintiffs’ excluded expert testimony is doubtless correct in its assertions, and plaintiffs
should have prevailed, except that they could simply not afford to bring their cases to trial
had they spent enough on testing and other indicia of reliability to meet the very high
Daubert standard.
Further, even in situations in which financial costs are not an insurmountable
barrier, the scientific conclusions of plaintiffs’ expertsin many cases are likely correct,
and plaintiffs should have prevailed, except that the scientifically correct conclusion was
not a scientifically provable conclusion – at any cost -- under the very high Daubert
standard. However, Professor Owen does not leave the assertion quoted above
unmitigated. In the same paragraph he notes “the fact remains that only infrequently is
Daubert invoked to exclude expert testimony proffered by defendants,”72 and elsewhere
he cautions that “courts must sedulously avoid using this important gate-keeping function
to bar evidence that actually may be sound.”73 I would prefer more elaboration on
Daubert’s significant costs to justice in addition to the discussion of its benefits, but
Professor Owen at least acknowledges that the standard may be subject to abuse.
Regardless of one’s views about Daubert and its progeny, the lavish attention
paid to the case by courts and scholars and its unique importance to products liability
serve as powerful evidence for Professor Owen’s assertion that products liability has
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come of age as a body of law, and that its inevitable future changes will be viewed as
evolution of a functionally distinct legal field. His belief in the law of products liability
is, with time, becoming increasingly irrefutable.
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